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Jury Responsibility in Capital Sentencing:
An Empirical Study
THEODORE EISENBERGt

STEPHEN

P. GARVEYtt

MARTIN T. WELLSttt

Ready... Aim... Fire!A life is taken. Each marksman seemingly bears responsibility for the condemned's death. But, in accord with tradition, one squad member-no one knows who-fires
a blank, giving all members a chance to deny responsibility.1
Avoiding responsibility for another's death, even when the state
authorizes it, is a widely held impulse. English judges who pronounced a death sentence would don a black hat, symbolizing that
it was the law and the state, not the judge, that had condemned
the defendant. Jurors, no less than executioners and judges, must
deal with this awesome burden.
The law allows executioners to deny responsibility for what
they have done by making it possible for them to believe they have
not done it. The law treats members of capital sentencing juries
quite differently. It seeks to ensure that they feel responsible for
sentencing a defendant to death. This differential treatment rests
t Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Primary funding for this project was provided
by National Science Foundation Grant # SES 90-13252. Supplementary funding was supplied by the Cornell Law School and the former South Carolina Death Penalty Resource
Center. We would like to thank Taron Brown, Deborah Czuba, Ryan Faulkner, H. Matthew
Horlacher, Marta Kahn, Lisa Kimbrough, David Kully, Mary Parasiliti, Michael Jay Stoltzfus, Erika Verrill, Mary Beth Welch, and Doug Wise for conducting the interviews, Eric
Ehrenberg and Jason Ehrenberg for research assistance and designing the database, Drucy
Glass for supervising the interviewing process, Laura Myers and Drucy Glass for training
the interviewers, Kevin Clermont, Steven Clymer, Sheri Johnson, Robert Kent, Jeffrey
Rachlinski, Stewart Schwab, and Steven Shiffrin for their comments, and Karen Wilson for
her invaluable assistance with the data.
tt Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
tt Associate Professor of Statistics, Department of Social Statistics, Cornell
University.
1. See Shannon Tangman, Delaware Hangs Double Murderer; And in Utah, Firing
Squad Gets Prepared,USA TODAY, Jan. 25, 1996, at A3. Gary Gilmore, the first inmate
executed after the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty in 1976,
was, until very recently, the only inmate in the post-Furman era to be executed by firing
squad. In any event, whether the blank round is a truly effective device for avoiding responsibility is dubious. The truth of the matter is that most members of firing squads will probably be able to tell whether the round they fired was live or a blank, since the recoil given off
by a blank round is noticeably weaker than that given off by a live one.
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on a presumed link between a capital sentencer's willingness to accept responsibility for the sentence she imposes and the accuracy
and reliability of that sentence. A reliable sentence requires a responsible sentencer, but if in fact jurors do not believe they are
responsible, the resulting sentence is rendered unreliable. Moreover, because the capital sentencing process is so complex and involves so many actors, jurors can always shift responsibility from
their shoulders onto someone else's. The result, critics assert, is a
capital sentencing system that makes death sentences at once unreliable and too easy to impose.2
Using interviews of 153 jurors who sat in South Carolina capital cases, this article examines empirically whether capital sentencing jurors assume responsibility for the sentence they impose. Part
I describes the constitutional doctrine relating to jury responsibility and sets out two different "models" of jury responsibility in the
capital sentencing context. Part II describes the data used in this
study and the applicable state-law, South Carolina's, governing the
penalty phase. Part III explores the extent to which jurors accept
responsibility for the capital sentencing decision and whether variation in accepting responsibility helps explain sentencing patterns.
Part IV addresses the factors that influence jurors' sense of responsibility. Part V offers our conclusions and discusses possible
reforms.
We emphasize at the outset that the data are not free from
ambiguity because the concept of responsibility is itself not free
from ambiguity. Among other things, responsibility may refer to
"role responsibility," which relates to the obligations one has flowing from a role one has assumed." In the capital sentencing context, role responsibility focuses on whether jurors understand and
accept the primary responsibility they have for the defendant's
sentence in the role they have assumed as sentencer. As between
the two potentially responsible legal actors at the sentencing
phase, jury and judge, who do jurors believe bears responsibility
for the defendant's sentence? Alternatively, responsibility may refer to "causal responsibility," which relates to whether or not, and
how strongly, someone or something figures in the causal chain
leading to some outcome. 4 Causal responsibility includes all the
2. See, e.g., Michael Mello, Taking Caldwell v. Mississippi Seriously: The Unconstitu-

tionality of Capital Statutes that Divide Sentencing Responsibility Between Judge and
Jury, 30 B.C. L. REv. 283 (1989); Robert Weisberg, DeregulatingDeath, 1983 Sup. CT. REV.
305, 391, 392.
3. Cf. H.L.A. HART, PumsmENT AND REsPONsmILrrY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OP
LAW 212-14 (1968).
4. Cf. id. at 214-15.

JURY RESPONSIBILITY
factors that might be responsible for the defendant's sentence, including, most importantly, the conduct of the defendant himself.
Although these notions of responsibility are distinct, they are
not mutually exclusive. Accepting role responsibility has causal
overtones. A juror who accepts role responsibility may well view
himself as more causally responsible for a death sentence than
would a juror who rejects role responsibility. Because of this overlap, jurors responding to interview questions may have interpreted
responsibility to refer to either or both of these senses of responsibility. In some cases the dominant notion of responsibility probably shifted as the question bearing on responsibility changed.
Nevertheless, the results suggest that distinguishing between
these two kinds of responsibility is useful and illuminating. Briefly,
we find that most jurors accept role responsibility for the capital
sentencing decision, though a significant minority do not. Most jurors understand and acknowledge the primary role they play in
sentencing a defendant to life or death. However, beliefs that cannot easily be changed limit the degree to which jurors view themselves as causing the defendant's sentence. Jurors view defendants
as primarily responsible for setting off the sequence of events leading to the sentencing decision and do not believe that most death
sentences will be carried out. While legal rules may be able to enhance jurors' sense of role responsibility, their sense of causal responsibility depends on facts and circumstances less amenable to
change.
Against a background of most jurors accepting role responsibility, we find limited evidence that jurors who impose life
sentences accept more responsibility than do jurors who impose
death sentences. In a bivariate model, a modest correlation exists
between acceptance of role responsibility and sentencing outcome.
In a multivariate model of the factors explaining the acceptance of
responsibility, however, the difference between jurors who imposed
life and jurors who imposed death all but disappears. Finally, we
find that it is difficult to explain why some jurors accepted responsibility while others did not.
I.

CONSTITuTIoNAL DOcTRINE & MODELS OF JUROR
RESPONSIBILrrY

A juror's sense of responsibility is important in capital sentencing because it is required for a "reliable" sentence. A central
feature of a capital trial's penalty phase is the jury's broad discretion to determine the defendant's sentence.5 Once the jury finds
5. All capital trials are bifurcated into a guilt phase and a penalty phase. In the guilt
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that the state has established a single, non-vague statutory aggravating circumstance, it is generally free to consider a wide range of
aggravating and mitigating evidence.' The penalty phase is built

on the idea that such discretion is needed to enable the jury to
reach a "reliable" or "appropriate" sentence. Yet precisely because
the jury enjoys such freedom, the outcome of a capital sentencing
proceeding depends significantly on how each juror understands
the task before him. Part of that understanding is the juror's sense
of responsibility for his decision. Accordingly, in Caldwell v. Mississippi7 the Supreme Court held that a capital sentencing juror

must not believe that the responsibility for the defendant's sentence rests somewhere other than with him, since a sentence imposed by a juror under this impression is thought to be unreliable.8
The rule announced in Caldwell rests on the assumption that

a death sentence is unreliable if it is imposed by a sentencer who
does not see herself as responsible for the defendant's sentence.,

The moral quality of the capital sentencing decision depends on
the sentencer believing she is responsible for the sentence. A sen-

tencer who believes she alone bears responsibility for the defendant's fate will attend to her task with the requisite degree of moral
seriousness, and a decision made without such seriousness is less
reliable. If a sentencer believes, or has been led to believe, that she
does not bear full responsibility, either because she can defer to
another actor's prior decision or can delegate her sentencing authority to a subsequent actor in the process, then the reliability of
the sentencer's decision is for that reason suspect. In our terminolphase the jury determines whether or not the defendant is guilty of a capital offense. In the
penalty phase the jury determines whether or not the punishment shall be death or a term
of imprisonment. In South Carolina, the focus of this study, the authority to determine a
capital defendant's sentence is, as in most states, ultimately vested in the jury. In a handful
of other states the judge or panel of judges imposes sentence. Colorado recently switched
from jury sentencing to sentencing by a three-member panel of judges, apparently in an
effort to bypass the reluctance of Colorado juries to impose death. See Brian Weber,
Coloradans Queasy About Death Penalty-HarlanCase Builds Support for 3-Judge System to Relieve Juries of Responsibility, RocKY MTN. NEWS, June 23, 1995, at A42.
6. See, e.g., Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862
(1983).
7. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
8. Id. at 328-29.
9. Id. at 329. Not all those who have studied capital sentencing would agree that the
sentencer should believe she bears responsibility for the sentence. According to the 1953
Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, some members of the English judiciary objected to vesting trial judges with discretion to impose death or life imprisonment,
since the "exercise of such a discretion would impose on the Judge a heavy, indeed an intolerable responsibility." ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT, 1949-53, Cim

8932, at 191.
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ogy, Caldwell insists that jurors understand and accept the role the
law assigns them as capital sentencers.10
A.

The Caldwell Model

Two basic models have informed thinking about juror responsibility in capital sentencing. The first model, implicit in the Supreme Court's discussion in Caldwell, takes an optimistic view
about the willingness and ability of jurors to assume responsibility
for the choice they must make. The second model, which draws on
the work of psychologist Stanley Milgram, takes a less sanguine
view. We turn first to the Caldwell model.
The defendant's counsel in Caldwell tried to impress on the
sentencing jury the serious nature of the task confronting it. His
"arguments were in large part pleas that the jury confront both the
gravity and the responsibility of calling for another's death, even in
the context of a capital sentencing proceeding."1" "In response, the
prosecutor sought to minimize the jury's sense of the importance of
its role. 1 2 In closing the prosecutor said:
Now, they [the defense] would have you believe that you're going to kill this
man and they know-they know that your decision is not the final decision.
My God, how unfair can you be? Your job is reviewable .... [T]hey know,

as I know, and as Judge Baker has told you, that the decision you render is
automatically reviewable by the Supreme Court. Automatically, and I think

it's unfair and I don't mind telling them so."'
The defendant was sentenced to death.
In the Supreme Court Justice Marshall, writing for four other
justices, held that the prosecutor's statements violated the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments."' "[I]t is
constitutionally impermissible," he wrote, "to rest a death sentence
on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of
the defendant's death rests elsewhere." 15 This was so because ju10. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 328-31. It is possible to view Caldwell as also insisting that
jurors feel causal responsibility. Accepting role responsibility for the sentencing decision
renders the sentencer a cause of the sentence. But the case's context constrains the possible
causal agents under consideration by the Court. Caldwell did not prohibit references to defendant's blameworthiness or brutality. To the extent Caldwell is about causal responsibility, it is constrained to considering only the possible causal agents at issue in the case, those
responsible for the sentencing outcome.
11. Id. at 324.
12. Id. at 325.
13. Id. at 325-26.
14. Id. at 328-29.
15. Id. The Court has subsequently read Caldwell narrowly, such that the prosecutor's
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rors who had been led to believe they were not responsible for the
defendant's sentence would, according to Justice Marshall, be
more likely to impose an "unreliable" sentence than would jurors
who had not been so mislead. 6
Justice Marshall gave two reasons why jurors might, if given
the opportunity, delegate to an appellate court their responsibility
for imposing the sentence they believed the defendant deserved. 17
The first was to "send a message.""' Jurors who had been led to
believe that an appellate court would decide the defendant's true
sentence might be inclined to impose death in order to express
their outrage at the defendant's conduct, confident that the proper
sentence, whatever it ought to be, would later be imposed on appeal."9 The second was simply to avoid any anxiety bound up with
being forced to determine if another person was to be put to
death. 20 As Justice Marshall explained, a capital sentencing jury is
made up of members of the community "placed in a very unfamiliar situation and called upon to make a very difficult and uncomfortable choice."21 They are "given only partial guidance" in reaching a decision and are left with "substantial discretion.

'2 2

Under

these circumstances they may welcome some way to decide not to
decide, thus silently delegating sentencing responsibility to a distant appellate court.2
This delegation would, Justice Marshall reasoned, not only
generate unreliable sentences, it would generate unreliable
statements must not only risk undermining the jury's sense of responsibility, but must also
misstate or misrepresent applicable state law. See, e.g., Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct.

2004, 2009-10 (1994); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 233-41 (1990); Dugger v. Adams, 489
U.S. 401, 407-08 (1989).
16. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 330. Moreover, the appropriate sentence would not have been
assessed on appeal, since the scope of appellate review in Mississippi did not extend to de
nova redetermination of the sentence. See id. Indeed, even if appellate review did encompass such a redetermination, a sentence determined in the first instance on appeal would be
morally suspect. Appellate courts decide on the basis of paper records. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 763 (1990). They do not see the defendant in the flesh. Never having
had "to confront and examine the individuality of the defendant" undermines the ability of
appellate tribunals to function as sentencers. Id. at 770 (Blackmon, J., concurring in the
judgement in part and dissenting in part). Nonetheless, the Court in Clemons upheld the
authority of state supreme courts, when they invalidate an aggravating circumstance, to "reweigh" the remaining aggravating circumstances, if any, against the mitigating circumstances and, if appropriate, affirm the death sentence. Id. at 738, 764.

17. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 330.
18. Id. at 331.

19. Id. at 332.
20. Id. at 332-33.
21. Id. at 333.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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sentences biased in favor of death. 24 A jury wishing to delegate its
sentencing responsibility might think that the only way it could
effectively do so would be to choose death, since a life sentence
would be unreviewable on appeal.25 The jury might correctly realize that while a death sentence could be reversed or reduced on
appeal for error during the penalty phase, a life sentence could not
be increased. 26 A jury wishing to delegate responsibility might thus
impose death, even if it otherwise concluded that the most appropriate sentence was life imprisonment. In short, the defendant
would not only be denied a fair determination of his sentence but
the process would be skewed in favor of death.2"
The image of juror responsibility implicit in Caldwell is, on
balance, an optimistic one, since it "take[s] as a given that capital
sentencers would view their task as the serious one of determining
whether a specific human being should [live or] die at the hands of
the State."2' Capital jurors are, on this view, ready, willing and
able to accept responsibility for the choice they must make. At the
same time, however, jurors are seen as having an incentive to avoid
making that decision, either to avoid responsibility altogether and
wash their hands of it, or to send a retributive message, safe in the
knowledge that the appropriate sentence would be imposed sometime later on in the process.30 In short, this model predicts that
capital jurors will accept responsibility unless openly encouraged
not to.
B.

The Milgram Model

Caldwell's assumption that jurors normally accept responsibility for capital sentencing has been questioned. Stanley Milgram's
famous experimental results on obedience to authority3 ' dominate
much of the thinking about how capital jurors deal with the question of sentencing responsibility. 82 His results present a much less
24. Id.
25. Id. at 322.
26. Id. at 332.

27. Id.
28. Id.

29. Id. at 329.
30. Id. at 329-32.
31. STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO

AuTHORTmY: AN EXPERIMENTAL ViEw (1974).

32. See, e.g., William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project:Rationale,Design, andPreview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1093 & nn.229-30 (1995) [hereinafter Bowers,
Capital Jury Project]; Craig Haney, Taking Capital Jurors Seriously, 70 IN. L.J. 1223,
1230 & n.37 (1995); Joseph L. Hoffman, Where's the Buck?-JurorMisperception of Sentencing Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137, 1137 (1995); Carol S.
Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Con-
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optimistic vision of the willingness or ability of capital jurors to
accept responsibility for their sentencing choice, since on this view
the very nature of the capital sentencing decision will send jurors
on a search to find someone or something else to assume responsibility for what they do. They need no prompting or encouragement
from the prosecutor.
1. The Milgram Experiments. Milgram's experiment involved the fundamental moral principle that "one should not inflict suffering on a helpless person who is neither harmful nor
threatening to oneself."33 He tested adherence to this principle by
seeing whether people would obey an authority figure whose instructions were to violate the principle.3 4 "A person coming to our
laboratory will be ordered to act against another individual in increasingly severe fashion. Accordingly, the pressures for disobedience will build up. At a point not known beforehand, the subject
may refuse to carry out this command, withdrawing from the experiment."3 5 The increasingly severe action was the administration
by the subject of increasingly severe electric shocks to a "student/
Learner" who gave incorrect answers to questions posed by the
"subject/Teacher" in response to instructions issued by the "authority figure/Experimenter."
The subjects were surprisingly obedient to Experimenter's orders to administer the shocks, which were in fact feigned. Milgram
hypothesized that the subjects' willingness to violate deeply held
moral norms against inflicting pain was the consequence of achieving what he labeled an "agentic state." In this agentic state, a person "sees himself as an agent for carrying out another person's
wishes."3 6 As a mere agent the individual absolves himself of responsibility for his acts. "In this condition the individual no longer
views himself as responsible for his own actions but defines himself
as an instrument for carrying out the wishes of others. 3 7
2. Implications for Capital Sentencing. At a general level,
Milgram's and other psychological results provide a basis for hypothesizing about juror responsibility in capital cases. Faced with
the task of deciding whether or not the defendant will be constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HAv. L. REv. 335, 413 n.293 (1995);
Weisberg, supra note 2, at 305, 343.
33. MMGRAM, supra note 31, at 13.
34. Id. at 13-14.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 133.
37. Id. at 134.
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demned, capital sentencing jurors, especially those who in fact sentence to death, may seek to shift responsibility to another source,
such as the law or the judge,"8 whether they have been encouraged
to or not.
Yet Milgram's experiments provide a useful analogy to capital
sentencing only at a general level. Substantial differences separate
Milgram's setting and capital sentencing. First, Milgram's subjects
thought they were inflicting pain on experimental volunteers,
whose only "wrongdoing" was answering a question incorrectly.
Capital jurors pass sentence on defendants convicted of aggravated
murder. Only those opposed to the death penalty on moral grounds
would be in a position approximating that of Milgram's subjects.
Second, even though they did not know the experiment they were
actually part of, Milgram's subjects knew they were part of some
experiment. One can not experimentally replicate a capital sentencing decision. Third, Milgram's experimental setting reduced
the possible causes of punishment to three: the authority figure,
the subject, and the shocked victim. 9 There was no overlay of law
and criminal behavior to complicate the causal mechanism resulting in the infliction of pain. Finally, Milgram's subjects believed
they were administering the electric shocks themselves but were
not asked to determine what the punishment should be. Capital
sentencing would more closely replicate Milgram's experiment if
jurors were told or believed that they themselves would be the
ones to actually execute a death sentence but that they were not
necessarily responsible for choosing it.
These differences complicate the experiments' implications for
theorizing about how capital case jurors will deal with responsibility. In the sentencing context, the content of role and causal responsibility, and their relationship, differ from the experimental
context. First, there is more room to differentiate between role responsibility and causal responsibility than in the experimental set38. Cf. HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIES OF OBEDIENCE: TOWARD A SOAND RESPONSIBILITY (1989) (examining social psychology of
questionable acts committed under orders from authority); Steven J. Sherman, The Capital
Jury Project: The Role of Responsibility and How Psychology Can Inform the Law, 70 IND.
L.J. 1241, 1241 (1995) (claiming that perceived responsibility affects decisionmaking and
CIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF AuTHoRIT

sentencing decision); Claudia M. Worrell, PsychiatricPrediction of Dangerousnessin Capital Sentencing: The Quest for Innocent Authority, 5 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 433, 438-43 (1987)

(discussing juror deferral to psychiatrists).
39. MILORAM, supra note 31, at 21, 51. An aloof source of authority for the punishment
could be viewed as a fourth possible causal agent. At several points the authority figure tells
the subject that "The experiment requires that you go on," or gives stronger commands. Id.

Milgram's experiment does not try to separate the role of the authority figure from that of
abstract "science" as a source of authority.
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ting. Milgram's controlled environment limited the difference between role responsibility and causal responsibility. Role
responsibility meant responsibility for administering the feigned
shock. Responsibility for the role of punishment administrator
could only be ascribed to subject or Experimenter. Causal responsibility introduced only one new factor, Learner, whom some subjects did blame. 40 Responsibility for the shocks, whether role or
causal, could only be ascribed to subject, Experimenter, and
Learner. Causal responsibility for capital sentencing introduces the
law, the judge, the defendant, and perhaps other possible sources.
In the world of capital sentencing, as the results presented below
show, the gap between the two kinds of responsibility is unavoidably large, and jurors do, it seems, differentiate between the two.
Second, causal responsibility is less complicated in the laboratory. The criminal defendant's causal role is more substantial and
complex than that of the shocked Milgram Learner. Learner was
not guilty of a morally wrongful act. Moreover, the law's causal
role transcends that of Experimenter or of the scientific method
Experimenter represents. The trial judge fulfills a role more analogous to that of Experimenter. The law is an overlay on top of his
authority. Given the defendant's wrongful behavior, the role of law
in capital sentencing, and the wider gap between causal and role
responsibility, jurors' notions of responsibility may not be directly
comparable to, or predictable from, Milgram's experiments. Indeed, to the limited extent our results can be compared with Milgram's, capital jurors accept more role responsibility than Milgram's subjects, while causal responsibility was more diffuse.
Lastly, it bears noting that the Milgram model of how jurors
will try to shed responsibility may, as applied to capital sentencing, rest on an understanding of responsibility that makes the
model impossible to disprove. The model may understand "responsibility" such that no morally respectable human being who really
accepted "responsibility" could ever sentence a fellow human being
to death.41 The cognitive dissonance jurors must suffer under such
circumstances would simply be too much for them. Yet, in fact,
jurors continue to sentence fellow citizens to death, over 3,000 of
them since 1972. Thus, so the argument goes, these jurors must
necessarily be assigning responsibility elsewhere. This claim is
treated as an analytic truth. What it means to accept responsibility
in capital sentencing is never to impose a death sentence; a death
40. Id. at 204.
41. Almost no one thought Milgram's subjects would obey the experimenter. "Only a
pathological fringe, not exceeding one or two percent, was expected to proceed to the end of
the shockboard." Id. at 31.
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sentence is conclusive evidence that responsibility was not assumed. Such a claim is, of course, beyond the power and techniques of social science to disprove.
There are, in short, good reasons to question how well the Milgram model of responsibility fits capital sentencing. Nonetheless, it
presents an alternative to the Caldwell model, and it has been, and
continues to be, very influential.
II. THE

DATA AND APPLICABLE STATE LAW

Little empirical research addresses the question of jurors'
sense of responsibility during the penalty phase, a gap in our undederstanding that has not gone unnoticed by those who must
42
velop legal rules designed to structure capital sentencing.
Jurors' views about the responsibility they have for the defendant's sentence raise two broad questions. The first, and most
straightforward, is whether or not capital sentencing jurors believe
they are "responsible" for the defendant's sentence? As we shall
see, reality is more nuanced than a simple "yes" or "no" answer
allows. However, if there must be a simple answer, it is "yes." Most
jurors accept role responsibility, though a disquietingly large minority do not. By way of contrast, jurors find ascribing causal responsibility to be a more complex task, since other things besides
the actions of the judge or jury bear a causal relationship to the
defendant's sentence. The second question arises precisely because
there exists inter-juror variation in accepting role responsibility-some jurors accept responsibility, while others do not: What
explains these differences? Possible explanations lie in jurors' personal characteristics, in defendants' characteristics, in the facts of
the crime, or in external factors such as jurors' perceptions about
the role of judges and appellate courts.
After describing the data and the applicable state law, Part III
addresses the question whether, and in what sense, capital jurors
accept responsibility for the sentencing decision. Part IV then
seeks to explain why some jurors accept role responsibility while
others do not.
A.

The Data

The data analyzed here were gathered as part of the Capital
Jury Project, a National Science Foundation-funded multistate research effort. Researchers trying to draw inferences about how jurors determine capital case sentences have tended to rely on
42. Cf. Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct. 2004, 2016 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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surveys of the general population, on anecdotal data from individual cases, and on material in the written record. Data have not
been systematically gathered from jurors who actually sat in capital cases. The data gathered by the Capital Jury Project are a rich
source of information about jurors' attitudes toward responsibility
for capital sentencing.
The results reported here are from the Capital Jury Project's
efforts in South Carolina. Jurors who sat in forty-three South Carolina murder cases were randomly sampled, with a goal of four juror interviews per case. The sample includes twenty-three cases resulting in death sentences and twenty cases resulting in life
sentences. The cases in the study consist of all South Carolina capital cases brought from enactment of the South Carolina Omnibus
Criminal Justice Improvements Act of 1986 to when interviews
were terminated in the summer of 1993.44 The 1986 law worked
fundamental changes in the standards of parole in capital cases
and provided a logical stopping point as we worked our way backwards from the most current cases available. A total of 153 live
interviews were completed by interviewers trained to work with
the interview instrument.
The fifty-one-page interview instrument, designed and tested
by the Capital Jury Project, covered all phases of the guilt and
sentencing trials. 45 The data gathered include facts about the
crime, racial, economic and other characteristics of the defendant,
the victim, and their families, the process of juror deliberation, and
the conduct of the case by defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the
judge. The interviews also included questions about jurors' background characteristics and their views on the death penalty.
The methodology used imposes a limitation on the conclusiveness of the analysis. Jurors were interviewed after they had served,
not before. We do not know for certain whether their reported attitudes and perceptions constituted reality at the time of the sentencing decision, or were "post facto adjustments of thought.' 40
43. Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: JurorInstructions in
Capital Cases, 79 CoRNELu L. REv. 1, 2 (1993).
44. 1986 S.C. Acts 2983. A few defendants had to be resentenced after flaws were found
in their initial sentencing proceedings. We include only the initial sentencing proceedings.
45. Juror Interview Instrument, National Study of JurorDecision Making in Capital
Cases, Justice Research Center, College of Criminal Justice, Northeastern University (on file
with the authors).
46. MILGRAM, supra note 31, at 204.

JURY RESPONSIBILITY
B. South Carolina'sDeath Penalty Statute
In South Carolina if a prosecutor has given notice that the
state seeks the death penalty, 47 a sentencing trial follows the defendant's conviction for murder. 4e After hearing evidence at the
sentencing phase, the jury must determine whether at least one
statutory aggravating circumstance is present. If an aggravating
circumstance is present a jury may, but is not required to, sentence
the defendant to death. Murder under aggravating circumstances
includes murder committed during the commission of certain serious crimes such as kidnapping and rape, murder of a police officer,
and murder by a defendant previously convicted of murder.4 9 The
jury must also consider statutory mitigating circumstances. These
include lack of prior convictions for violent crime, the age or
mental capacity of the defendant, duress, and provocation.5" If the
jury does not unanimously find in favor of death, the defendant is
automatically sentenced to life imprisonment."1
Jurors' perceptions about responsibility may well vary across
states, depending on state law. In South Carolina the jury's sentencing verdict is formally designated a "recommendation" to the
trial judge, who has final sentencing authority. However, the South
Carolina Supreme Court, relying on Caldwell, has "required that
the trial judge convey to the jury in the sentencing phase.., that
its sentencing recommendation will be followed." 52 In other states,
47. S.C.

CODE ANN.

§ 16-3-26(A) (Law. Co-op. 1995).

48. Id. § 16-3-20(B).
49. Id. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1), (2),
§§ 16-3-20(C)(a)(3)-(6), (8)-(10).
50. Id. § 16-3-20(C)(b).

(7). The other aggravating circumstances appear at id.

51. Id. § 16-3-20(C).
52. State v. Bellamy, 359 S.E.2d 63 (S.C. 1987); accord State v. Davis, 411 S.E.2d 222
(S.C. 1991); State v. Sims, 405 S.E.2d 377, 384 (S.C. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1193
(1992); State v. Cain, 377 S.E.2d 556, 562-63, (S.C. 1988) cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1010 (1990);
State v. Middleton, 368 S.E.2d 457, 461 (S.C.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988). Failure to
inform the jury that its "recommendation" is in fact binding on the trial court is reversible
error. State v. Plemmons, 370 S.E.2d 871, 872 (S.C. 1988).

There are no pattern jury instructions on the issue of responsibility in South Carolina.
Different trial court judges convey the fact that the jury's decision is binding on the judge in
different ways. See, e.g., State v. Hudgins (1993) ("Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the
defendant in this case, having been found guilty of murder, it is now your duty to determine
which sentence I impose upon him for having been convicted of murder."); State v. Elkins
(1991) ("[L]adies and gentlemen of the jury . . .[a]s you know, the defendant . . .has
been found guilty of murder and armed robbery. Now it's your duty to determine which
sentence the court impose [sic] upon the defendant for having committed the offense of
murder."); State v. Bell (1987) ("It is your duty at this time to determine which sentence
you will recommend that the court impose upon the defendant .

. ..

Your recommendation

is the sentence in this case."); State v. Smith (1987) ("You must decide whether to recom-
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this pattern may not necessarily hold true.53
I.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE

Four groups of interview questions shed light on whether jurors accept responsibility for capital sentences. First, interviewers
asked jurors directly how the jurors allocated responsibility for determining the defendant's punishment. A second group of questions explored whether, and to what extent, jurors felt free to exercise sentencing discretion. Jurors might shed responsibility if they
believed the law commanded a sentence, leaving them little discretion, or if they believed death sentences are rarely carried out, rendering their sentence less relevant. Answers to a third group of
questions supplied reactions that could be proxies for feelings of
responsibility. For example, jurors who exhibited symptoms of
stress could be viewed as feeling responsible for their decision.
Fourth, jurors' approaches to decisionmaking could shed light on
their sense of responsibility. If they regard sentencing as essentially a mechanical task of adding up pros and cons, they may not
feel fully responsible.
Responses to these groups of questions indicate that, as between themselves and the judge, most jurors accept role responsibility for sentencing. Jurors' sense of their causal responsibility, in
contrast, is limited by a strong sense of the defendants' causal responsibility and by beliefs about how the criminal justice system
operates. Jurors view defendants as primarily responsible for the
situation. Furthermore, jurors' knowledge that executions occur infrequently may unavoidably diminish their sense of causal
responsibility.
A.

Direct Questions About Responsibility

Two questions directly ask to whom jurors ascribe responsibility. Table 1 presents these questions and the jurors' responses.
Question 1-1 asked jurors "when you were considering the punishmend that the court sentence the defendant to life imprisonment or sentence the defendant
to death.... You will notice I have used the word recommendation in referring to your

decision.... I have used this word because that is the word used in the statute itself, but,
it [sic] is to understand that your decision is really more than a recommendation as you or I
might use the word in everyday speech. I tell you this because the law provides that
whatever your recommendation is, I as the judge[,] accept it.") (transcripts of jury instruc-

tions on file with authors).
53. See Bowers, Capital Jury Project, supra note 32, at 1095 n.233 (reporting somewhat different responsibility responses in judge override states and in states in which the
jury recommendation is binding).

JURY RESPONSIBILITY

19961

ment, did you think that whether the defendant lived or died" was
strictly or mostly the jury's responsibility, partly the jury's and
partly the judge's, or mostly the judge's and appeals courts'. The
most likely interpretation of this question is one involving role responsibility. The role of capital juror brings with it the obligation
to follow the law. In capital sentencing "following the law" means
simply deciding the "proper" sentence after considering all the relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The law allocates
to the jury the authority to decide what punishment the defendant
will receive. Question 1-i's reference to responsibility might therefore be understood to be asking where the juror thought decisionmaking authority rested.
Question 1-2 asked jurors to rank various actors in the process,
along with the "law," in terms of their "responsibility for the defendant's punishment." One interpretation of this question is that
it, like Question 1-1, is asking about where decisionmaking authority rests. Another is that it is asking about causal responsibility,
about the links in the causal chain leading to the defendant's punishment, whether life or death.
54
Table 1. Direct Questions About Responsibility

1-1. When you were considering the punishment, did you think that whether defendant lived or
died was... (some responses paraphrased) (Form Question IV.12)
life jurors death jurors totals
% N %
N % N
26 37% 16 21% 42 28%
strictly the jury's responsibility and no one else's
mostly the jury's responsibility, but the judge or appeals courts take over
responsibility whenever they overrule or change the jury's decision
partly jury's and partly judge's and appeals courts'
mostly judge's and appeals courts'; we make the first decision but they
make the final decision

17

24% 29

37%

46

31%

19
8

27% 15
11% 18

19%
23%

34
26

23%
18%

totals
Kendall's T p = .071

70

47% 78

53%

148 100%

1-2. Rank the following from "most" through "least" responsible for defendant's punishment.
Give 1 for most through 5 for least responsible (Form Question IV.13)
actor
defendant because his/her conduct is what actually
determined the punishment
the law that states what punishment applies
the individual juror...
the jury that votes for the sentence
the judge who imposes the sentence

5=least
3
4
2
1=most
N
% N %
N % N % N %
78 52% 13 8% 8 5% 12 8% 38 26%
41
17
I1
4

27%
11%
7%
3%

64 42% 15 10/ 17
34 23% 44 30/o 24
29 19/ 57 38% 51
II 7% 25 17% 44

11% 13 9%
16% 31 21%
34% 2 1%
30%65 44%

54. Since there is a natural ordering to the responses to Question 1-1, Kendall's r test is
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In responding to Question 1-1, substantial majorities of jurors
in both life and death cases indicate that the jury is mostly responsible for whether the defendant lived or died. Question 1-i's
"totals" column shows that 59 percent of jurors stated that the life
or death decision was mostly or strictly the jury's responsibility.
The response "partly jury's and partly judge's" is ambiguous and
could be counted as the jury taking substantial responsibility even
if not a clear majority of it. This would raise the level of jurors
accepting substantial responsibility to over 80 percent. Put another
way, only 18 percent of the jurors responded that whether the defendant lived or died was mostly the responsibility of the judge
and the appeals courts. This pattern of responses is largely the
same as that reported in a study using Capital Jury Project data
from several states.8
Question 1-2 offers the jurors more possible sources of responsibility, adding the law, the individual jurors, and the defendant as
possible responses. Given these added choices, the jurors ascribed
the bulk of responsibility to the defendant and the law. The juror
and jury responses ranked far behind. The law and the defendant
were viewed as most responsible, the judge the least responsible,
and the jury and individual jurors were in the middle. The jurors
seem to view the defendant, presumably due to his or her acts, as
the primary force responsible for punishment. The law, which authorizes the punishment, was the other major force. Again, the responses replicate those in a study reporting multi-state data. 58
used to test the significance of the relationship between responsibility and sentencing outcome. Another test of significance takes account of the fact that, since the sentencing decision allows no intra-case variation, the data contain only forty-three sentencing outcomes,
not one for each of the 153 jurors interviewed. If one regards responsibility as a covariate of
the life-death decision, it is appropriate to compute a mean value of responsibility for each
of the forty-three cases. A Wilcoxon rank-sum test of the significance of these mean responsibility values and sentencing outcomes yields p=.141. See ALAN AGPREsTi, CATEGORICAL
DATA ANALYsis 306-85 (1990).

55. Bowers, Capital Jury Project,supra note 32, at 1096 (tab. 11). Additional reactions
to Question 1-i's responses are possible. Id. It is disturbing that 18% or even 41% of the
jurors do not acknowledge greater role responsibility, but casual conversations with colleagues confirm our instinct that the results show a surprising degree of acceptance of responsibility by jurors. While striving for greater levels of responsibility is desirable, the data
do not suggest a hypothesized massive abdication of responsibility by jurors. But see William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury: Is It Tilted Toward Death?, 79 JuDicATURE 220, 223
(1996) [hereinafter Bowers, Tilted Toward Death] ("Most capital jurors disclaim primary or
sole responsibility for the awesome life or death decision they must make.")
Another interview question probed what sentence jurors perceived the judge as favoring. Jurors who voted the way they thought the judge would vote could be viewed as shifting
responsibility to the judge. The vast majority of jurors, however, 128 of 151 (85%), reported
having "no idea what the judge favored or opposed." (Form Question lI.C.18).
56. Bowers, Capital Jury Project, supra note 32, at 1094 (tab. 10); see also Bowers,
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At one level, the responses to Question 1-2 seem to undermine
the responses to Question 1-1. How can jurors, who accept the bulk
of responsibility in Question 1-1, view themselves as such minor
actors in response to Question 1-2? More directly, does Question 12 confirm the notion, premised on the Milgram model, that jurors
try to spurn decisionmaking responsibility? Not necessarily.
First, Question 1-2, when juxtaposed to Question 1-1, could
easily be interpreted by a respondent as asking a different question. While Question 1-1 focuses on who among those with some
role in the decisionmaking process is responsible for deciding between life or death, Question 1-2 takes a broader perspective and
includes a wider range of possible determinants, including the law
and the defendant. Question 1-2 could thus have been construed as
asking a question about causal responsibility: "What caused the
defendant to receive the punishment he did?" Question 1-1, in
contrast, seems more likely to have been construed as asking about
the locus of decisionmaking authority and about role responsibility: "Who had the authority to decide whether the defendant lived
or died?" With Question 1-2 immediately following Question 1-1 in
the interview, it would be natural to view Question 1-2 as focusing
on a different issue and not merely rephrasing the Question 1-1
inquiry.
Insofar as Question 1-1 focuses on and isolates the jurors' beliefs about decisionmaking authority, it represents the more relevant inquiry for constitutional law purposes. The Supreme Court's
opinions dealing with juror responsibility are not primarily concerned with how jurors would allocate causal responsibility among
all the actors and factors listed in Question 1-2. Neither the law
nor the defendant have the same relationship to the death-penalty
decision as do the judge and jury. By the time the capital sentencing decision is made, the defendant is no longer a relevant decisionmaker in the system, and the law, for its part, is fixed. The
most plausible candidates to whom responsibility for the defendant's sentence can be allocated are the judge and the jury.
Second, when Question 1-2 is viewed as a more encompassing
question about causal responsibility the juror responses are not implausible. Of the string of causes leading to a death sentence, there
is no doubt that the defendant, through his or her acts, is the sine
qua non of the punishment ultimately imposed. The law is also a
"but for" cause, since without a statute expressly authorizing capital punishment, the defendant could not have been sentenced to
death. Without the defendant's acts, without the death-authorizing
Tilted Toward Death, supra note 55, at 222-23.
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legal framework, the jurors would not have been where they were:
deciding life and death in a capital case. One can accept the pattern of Question 1-2's responses on their face 57
without concluding
they undermine the responses to Question 1-1.

Third, the polar responses about the defendant's responsibility in Question 1-2 also suggest some confusion about the question.
The two most common responses to the defendant's level of responsibility were "most" and "least." Most jurors (52 percent) said
the defendant was the "most responsible" for punishment, but
many (26 percent) said the defendant was "least responsible."
Since the question allowed three levels of intermediate responses,
this pattern is jarring and is not replicated for any of the other
four factors in Question 1-2. This unusual pattern of responses to
the defendant's responsibility suggests that different jurors interpreted Question 1-2 differently. To some, the defendant was most
responsible because the defendant committed the crime. To others,
the defendant was least responsible because, having committed the
crime, the defendant no longer had any part to play in deciding
punishment. Question 1-2 thus admits of two possible interpretations, both of which find some support in the responses. Exactly
what to make of the Question 1-2 responses is therefore uncertain.
In sum, responses to Question 1-2 do not undermine the conclusion drawn from responses to Question 1-1 that most jurors accept responsibility. Question 1-2 is perhaps best understood as approaching the idea of responsibility from a different perspective
and tapping a different notion of responsibility. Many jurors probably interpreted it as asking a question about causal responsibility.
Jurors clearly interpreted at least one part of the question-that
dealing with the defendant's responsibility-differently, generating
a peculiar pattern of responses. Taken together, the responses to
Question 1-1 and 1-2 show the importance of what is asked. When
given a chance to take into account multiple causes, jurors ranked
themselves ahead of judges in responsibility but behind other elements of the complete system. When pinned down to two relevant
actors, themselves and judges, most jurors understood and acknowledged the central and predominant role they play."'
57. See Valerie P. Hans, How Juries Decide Death: The Contributionsof the Capital
Jury Project, 70 IND. L.J. 1233, 1237 (1995) ("I believe that the defendant's perceived responsibility could be considered along an independent dimension, and that jurors themselves could still experience a sense of personal responsibility for their own actions.").
58. Although they do not change the thrust of the results reported in Table 1, it is
worth noting the responses to Questions 1-1 and 1-2 broken down by individual jurors' first
vote during the penalty-phase deliberations. Of those jurors who first voted for death, 26.2%
said in response to Question 1-1 that responsibility was strictly the jury's, while 17.9% said
it was mostly the judge's and appeals courts'. Of those jurors who first voted for life, 39.6%
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Data on assignment of responsibility from the Milgram experiments help place the responses to Questions 1-1 and 1-2 in,perspective. Table 2 shows Milgram's reports of his subjects' assignment of responsibility."9 We have added the second row to suggest
the relationships among Milgram's actors and the analogous capital-sentencing actor. With three possible persons among whom to
apportion responsibility, Milgram's subjects (the "Teacher" column in Table 2) tended to blame themselves or the authority figure, "Experimenter." Both defiant subjects, those who at some
point refused to subject "Learner" to electric shocks, and obedient
subjects, those who administered the full range of shocks, tended
not to blame Learner. 0
Table 2. Assignment of Responsibility
Experimenter
N
(Analogous Sentencing Actor) (Judge/Law)
38.8%
61
Defiant Subjects
57
38.4
Obedient Subjects

by Milgram's Subjects
Learner
Teacher/subject
(Defendant)
(Jwy)
12.8%
48.4%
25.3
36.3

Comparing Table 2 with the responses to Question 1-2 shows
capital case jurors were more inclined to assign responsibility to
the criminal defendant than Milgram's subjects were inclined to
assign responsibility to Learner. This could show a greater tendency to shift responsibility, but an alternative interpretation is
available. The defendants sentenced by the jurors were more
blameworthy than were Milgram's Learners. Learners had done
nothing more than volunteer for an experiment and answer a few
questions incorrectly.6 1 The defendants had been convicted of aggravated murder.
Rather than compare Table 2 with Question 1-2, we might
more appropriately compare it with Question 1-1. By reducing Table 2's responses to Experimenter and Teacher, we can loosely
compare Table 2 with responses to Question 1-1, which limits assaid responsibility was strictly the jury's, while 18.8% said it was mostly the judge's and
appeals courts'. Of those jurors who first voted for death, 60.2% said in response to Question 1-2 that the defendant was most responsible for his punishment, while 19.3% said he
was least responsible; of those who first voted for life, 40.8% said the defendant was most
responsible, while 30.6% said he was least responsible.
59. Table 2 is based on MmGRAm, supra note 31, at 203 (tab. 9).
60. Defiant subjects differed from obedient subjects in their willingness to accept responsibility and their lesser tendency to assign responsibility to Learner, but neither group
assigned much responsibility to Learner and the differences between the two groups were
not striking.
61. M LGRAM, supra note 31, at 204. Milgram reports the reasons for blaming the
Learners as follows: "When questioned on this matter, they point to the fact that he volunteered for the experiment and did not learn very efficiently." Id.
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signment of responsibility to judge and jury. Such a reduction of
Table 2 raises the question of how to treat the portion of responsibility ascribed to Learner. Do we ignore the Learner responses or
do we ascribe a portion of them to Experimenter and Teacher?
The precise method of eliminating Learner's portion of responsibility turns out not to be very important. However one recharacterizes the Experimenter and Teacher responses in Table 2, the responses to Question 1-1 indicate that capital case jurors accepted
more responsibility vis-h-vis the judge than Milgram's subjects accepted vis-&-vis their authority figure, Experimenter. 2 As between
the two primary sentencing actors, judge and jury, capital case jurors shifted responsibility less than the Milgram subjects did.
Although Milgram's responsibility results are a useful reference point, the comparison is limited because Milgram did not explicitly give his subjects an opportunity to choose whether or not
to shock the victim. Jurors do explicitly make this choice. That
capital jurors felt more responsible may simply reflect Milgram's
efforts to make his subjects feel no responsibility.
B.

Impact of the Law and the Legal System on Responsibility

Jurors' beliefs about the discretion allowed them by the law
and about the legal system's actual operation may provide additional insights into their sense of responsibility. First, jurors who
believe that the law commands a particular sentence may feel less
role responsibility than jurors who believe they have discretion to
select the sentence. Second, jurors' beliefs about the legal system's
actual operation may influence responsibility. For example, jurors
who believe no one is actually executed may not feel the burden of
sentencing responsibility as much as jurors who believe death
sentences are regularly carried out.
Four interview questions probed jurors' beliefs about how
much freedom the law gave them to determine the defendant's
62. If one eliminates the Learner responses, the defiant subjects apportioned responsibility 48.4%/(48.4% + 38.4%) = 55.5% to themselves (Teacher) and the obedient subjects
accepted less responsibility. If one reallocates all of the Learners' shares to Teacher then the
defiant subjects accepted 61.2% of responsibility and the obedient subjects accepted 61.6%
of responsibility. In contrast, Question 1-1 shows 59% of jurors accepting all or most responsibility and 23% accepting part responsibility. If we transform acceptance of all responsibil.
ity to 100%, "mostly jury's" to 75%, "partly jury's" to 50% and "mostly judge's" to 25%,
then jurors responding to Question 1-1 accepted 67% of responsibility. If we take a less
extreme view of mostly and make "mostly jury's" 60% and "mostly judge's" 40%, the results do not materially change. Jurors did not accept substantially less responsibility than
Milgram's subjects.

1996]

359

JURY RESPONSIBILITY

sentence 8 Table 3 reports the questions and summarizes the
responses.
Table 3. Jurors' Beliefs About the Discretion the Law Allowed Them
3-1. After hearing the judge's instructions, did you believe that the law required you to impose a death
sentence if the evidence proved that defendant's conduct was heinous, vile or depraved? (Form
Question IH.C.17)
totals
death jurors
life jurors
%
N
%
N
%
N
33% 50
34%
24
35%
26
yes
67% 97
66%
45
65%
52
no
53% 147 100%
69
47%
78
totals
Fisher's exact test p= .863
3-2. After hearing the judge's instructions, did you believe that the law required you to impose a death
sentence if the evidence proved that defendant would be dangerous in the future? (Form Question
ILC.17)
totals
life jurors
death jurors
%
N
%
N
%
N
30%
18 26% 26 33% 44
yes
70%
53 67% 104
51
74%
no
100%
79 53%
148
69 47%
totals
Fisher's exact test p= .375
3-3. To the best of your memory, was the jury required to impose a death sentence, or free to choose between
death and a lesser sentence, if it found... (Form Question V.5)
free to choose
death required
N
%
N
%
one or more factors favoring a death sentence
one or more factors favoring a death sentence &none opposing it
more factors favoring than opposing a death sentence
stronger factors favoring than opposing a death sentence
an equal balance between factors favoring & opposing a death sentence

93%

10

7%

124

24

190/

105

81%

11
13
1

9%
10%
2%

118
117
125

91%
90%
98%

3-4. To the best ofyour memory, was the jury required to impose a sentence of life or less or free to choose
between death and a lesser sentence, if it found ... (Form Question V.9)
life or less required free to choose
11% .,,.113 , 89%
14
one or more factors op osing a death sentence
103
81%
24
19%
one or more factors opposing a death sentence & none favoring it
111
83%
22
17%
more factors opposing than favoring a death sentence
18%
107
82%
23
stronger factors opposing than favoring a death sentence
92%
I1
8%
122
an equal balance between factors favoring & opposing a death sentence

63. A related question asked: "Did you believe that once you had convicted defendant
of murder, the law of this state made the death penalty. . ." (Form Question III.B.13).
Eighty-four jurors (56%) responded "just one available punishment," 49 (33%) responded
"the most appropriate punishment," and 16 (11%) responded "the only appropriate punishment." Since the question read in terms of the appropriateness of the punishment, the responses' relationship to responsibility are ambiguous. Jurors may have thought that they
had freedom under the law to choose the sentence but that a particular sentence was most
appropriate. The questions in Table 3 focus more directly on whether the law compelled a
particular sentencing outcome.
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Questions 3-1 to 3-4 probed jurors' beliefs about their sentencing discretion. Questions 3-1 and 3-2 explored jurors' beliefs about
discretion given their findings about the crime and the defendant's
dangerousness. Questions 3-3 and 3-4 asked about discretion in
light of a more general assessment of the factors opposing and
favoring a death sentence. Jurors who believed they had discretion
should be more apt to acknowledge responsibility than jurors who
believed that the law dictated the sentence. Conversely, jurors who
believed they had no discretion to select a sentence, which the law
simply dictated in light of findings of heinousness or dangerousness, should be less likely to accept responsibility.
The responses to Questions 3-1 to 3-4 are consistent with the
responses to Question 1-1. Questions 3-1 and 3-2 show that a substantial majority of jurors did not believe that the law required a
death sentence even if they believed the evidence proved heinousness or dangerousness. Thus, most jurors did not shift responsibility away from themselves and towards a legally mandated death
sentence. Interestingly, jurors who thought they were required to
sentence to death if they found heinousness, tended to accept more
role responsibility, compared to the judge, than jurors who did not
think death was required. This effect approaches statistical significance (p = .072)." There was no statistically significant relationship between responsibility and jurors believing they were required
to sentence to death if they found dangerousness (p = .952).
Questions 3-3 and 3-4 show that jurors believe they have considerable freedom to choose a life or death sentence regardless of
the number or weight of aggravating and mitigating factors. However the combination of factors favoring or opposing a death sentence were characterized, at least 81 percent of the jurors believed
they were free to choose the sentence.6 Jurors thus regard themselves as free to exercise discretion, a result consistent with the
finding that most jurors accept role responsibility.
However, Table 3 also reveals a disturbing finding about a significant minority of jurors. Nearly one-third of the jurors were
under the mistaken impression that the law required a death sentence if they found heinousness or dangerousness, a result replicated in a multi-state study of the interview data.66 These jurors
failed to understand the scope of their own discretion. Interest64. We used Kendall's 7 to test the significance of the relationship between the "yes/
no" responses to Question 3-1 and the responses to responsibility Question 1-1. See supra

note 54.
65. None of the responses summarized for Questions 3-3 or 3-4 were significantly correlated (p < .05) with sentencing outcome or with Question 1-1.
66. Bowers, Capital Jury Project, supra note 32, at 1091 (tab. 7).
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ingly, this confusion does not correlate strongly with the jurors'
sentencing behavior. 7 There is no statistically significant correlation between an erroneously constrained view of their discretion
and whether jurors sentenced to life or death.
Further insight into jurors' perceived responsibility comes
from jurors' beliefs about how the legal system operates after their
sentencing decision. Post-trial activity plays a prominent role in
capital cases, and appeals now can take several years. Jurors' views
on post-trial review of their decisions can help refine the interpretation of the direct responsibility questions. After all, the prosecutor's mistake in Caldwell was to suggest that the jurors' sentencing
decision would be revisited on appeal.
In Questions 4-1 to 4-3, the jurors were asked about their beliefs regarding the chances that the trial judge or an appellate
court would accept or reject the sentence they imposed, and about
whether death sentences would actually be carried out. Table 4
summarizes the questions and responses.

67. Similar confusion about other aspects of the law are discussed in Eisenberg &
Wells, supra note 43, at 10-11; Haney, supra note 32, at 1229-30; and James Luginbuhl &
Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided or Misguided?, 70 IND.
L.J. 1161, 1165-75 (1995).
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Table 4. Trial Judge's and Appellate Courts' Role
4-1. How likely did you think it was that murderers sentenced to death in this state will be
executed? (Form Question IV.8)
lifejurors
nearly all will eventually be executed
most will be executed
about halfwill be executed
less than half will be executed
very few will ever be executed
totals
2
Pearson's X (4) = 6.0193; p = .198

deathjurors

total

N

%

N

%

N

%

6
6
7
10
41
70

9%
9%
10%
14%
59%
47%

1
I
8
16
43
79

1%
14%
10%
20%
54%
53%

7
17
15
26
84
149

5%
11%
10%
17%
56%
100%

4-2. How likely did you think it was that a jury decision for the death penalty would be accepted
or rejected by the trial judge? (Form Question IV.9)
life jurors
judge must accept the jury's decision; it's final
judge would probably accept the jury's decision
judge would probably reject thejury's decision
had no idea what thejudge would do
totals
Pearson's X2(3)= 4.3153; p =.229

death jurors

totals

N

%

N

%

N

%

33
19
1
18
71

47%
27%
1%
26%
47%

40
29
0
12
81

49%
36%
0%
15%
53%

73
48
1
30
152

48%
32%
1%
20%
100%

4-3. How likely did you think it was that a death sentence in this case would be accepted or

rejected by the appeals courts? (Form Question IV.10)
life jurors

appeals courts accept nearly all death sentences
appeals courts accept most death sentences
appeals court reject as many as they accept
appeals courts reject most death sentences
appeals court[s] reject nearly all death sentences
had no idea what the appeals courts would do
totals
2
Pearson's X (5)= 4.9915;p=.417

death jurors

totals

N

%

N

%

N

%

7
7
5
4
8
40
71

10%
10%
7%
6%
11%
56%
47%

10
13
8
3
3
44
81

12%
16%
10%
4%
4%
54%
53%

17
20
13
7
I1
84
152

11%
13%
9%
5%
7%
55%
100%

The responses to these questions both confirm and complicate
interpretation of the responses to Table l's direct responsibility
questions. The responses to Questions 4-2 and 4-3 indicate that
jurors do not believe their decision will likely be revised by the
trial judge or appellate judges. Question 4-3 shows that a substantial majority of jurors reported having had no idea what an appeals
court would do. Of those expressing an opinion about what the appeals courts do, more thought death sentences would be upheld
than struck down. This suggests that jurors do not view appeals
courts as displacing their responsibility for the sentence imposed.

Question 4-2 asks jurors about how they think the trial judge will
likely react to their sentencing decision. It too provides little evi-
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dence that jurors turn to the trial court to escape responsibility.
The great majority of jurors thought the trial judge "must" or
"would probably" accept their sentencing decision."8
Questions 4-2 and 4-3 thus reveal a similar pattern. Jurors,
when directly asked about likely behavior of trial and appellate
judges, do not respond in ways that would suggest they shed substantial role responsibility.
Responses to Question 4-1 are interestingly and disturbingly
different. On the whole, jurors simply do not believe that defendants sentenced to death will in fact ever be executed. A clear majority say that "very few" death-sentenced defendants will ever be
executed, and about 70 percent of jurors believe that "less than
half" or "very few" will be executed. It is not clear who jurors believe block executions because Questions 4-2 and 4-3 suggest that
they attribute the dearth of executions to neither trial judges nor
appellate judges. Perhaps jurors do not know what an appeals
court will do in their case but believe that, in many cases, appeals
courts prevent executions.
Whatever the source of jurors' beliefs, the responses to Question 4-1 suggest a limit on how much responsibility jurors can feel
for their sentencing decision. Even though Question 1-1 indicates
that jurors understand and accept role responsibility for their sentencing decision, the weight and impact of that understanding and
belief must be diminished insofar as most jurors believe death
sentences are rarely carried out. Still, at the time of the survey,
South Carolina's capital statute had been in effect for 16 years and
three inmates had been executed. Juror responses to Question 4-1
thus fairly reflect how the system had been functioning. Respondents cannot ignore as jurors what they know as citizens.69 Jurors'
beliefs about the frequency of executions do not significantly correlate with their reported levels of role responsibility; however, it
should be noted that of the very few (7) respondents who believed
"nearly all" death sentences will be executed, most (6 out of 7)
68. Although 48% of the jurors said the judge must accept the jury's decision, which is
the largest response to Question 4-2, this figure is still troublingly small. Capital sentencing
juries should, in the absence of legal error, harbor no uncertainty about the finality of the
decision they make. Question 4-2 suggests ample room to improve juror understanding
about their role in capital sentencing.
69. Anecdotal evidence supports the observation that jurors who believe death
sentences will in fact be carried out are less apt to return them. For example, when the state
of Louisiana executed several inmates within the course of a couple weeks, a trend which
received considerable media attention in Louisiana, there was a noticeable drop in the number of death sentences subsequently returned by capital juries. See Jason DeParle, Abstract
Death Penalty Meets Real Execution, N.Y. TInas, June 30, 1991, at E2.
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voted for life.70
C. Proxies for Responsibility
Accepting responsibility for a difficult decision can generate
tangible side-effects. Three interview questions explored juror reactions to capital jury service that might be associated with jurors'
attitudes towards responsibility. One question asked whether jurors found their capital jury experience emotionally upsetting. A
second asked whether, during the trial or right after it, jurors had
nightmares or other tangible symptoms of stress. A third asked
how jurors would feel if again asked to serve on a capital case. Table 5 summarizes these questions and the responses.
Table 5. Proxies for Responsibility
5-1. Did you find the experience emotionally upsetting? (Form Question IX.23)
lifejurors death jurors
totals
%
N
%
%
N
N
65% 103 69%
52 73% 51
yes
35% 47
31%
19 27% 28
no
totals
71 47% 79
53% 150 100%
Fisher's exact test p = .292
5-2. During the trial or right after it, did you have any trouble sleeping, any bad dreams or nightmares, or
lose your appetite? (Form Question IX.24)
life jurors
death jurors
totals
N
%
N
%
N
%
yes
30 42% 27 34%
57
38%
no
41 58% 52 66% 93
62%
totals
71
47%
79 53% 150 100%
Fisher's exact test p = .318
5-3.How would you feel ifyou were asked to serve on another death penalty case? Would you... (Form
Question IX.25)
life jurors
death jurors
totals
N
%
N
%
N
%
28%
21
30% 20
27% 41
welcome the opportunity
41%
25
35% 34
47% 59.
do so reluctantly
14 20% il
15% 25
17%
trytoget outofit
13%
I1 15% 8
11% 19
refuse to do so
51% 144 100%
71
49% 73
totals

70. Correlating Question 4-1 with responsibility Question 1-1 yields p = .385 (based on
Kendall's 7). A Wilcoxon rank-sum test of sentencing outcome and the case means of the
perceived likelihood of execution yields p=.601. See supra note 54.
71. A Wilcoxon rank-sum test of sentencing outcome and the forty-three case means of
"yes" responses for Question 5-1 yields p = .480. See supra note 54. For Question 5-2 the
Wilcoxon rank-sum test p = .730, and for Question 5-3 p = .429.
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Table 5 shows that, in the responses to Question 5-1, 103 of
150 jurors found the experience to be emotionally upsetting. Such
a reaction may suggest that jurors accepted responsibility for their
sentencing decision. 2 A person is less likely to be upset about her
choices and actions if she does not accept responsibility for them.
Question 5-2 also shows that a substantial minority of jurors, 38
percent, exhibit tangible symptoms of stress during or after the
trial. This, too, may suggest acceptance of responsibility. What to
make of the responses to Question 5-2 is difficult because we lack a
baseline. Our instinct is that an experience that yields tangible
symptoms of stress in more than one-third of its participants is not
one in which decisionmaking was taken lightly. Question 5-3 asked
how amenable jurors would be to serving again in a capital case.
About 30 percent stated that they would try to get out of it or
refuse to serve. Forty-one percent indicated that they would serve
reluctantly. Twenty-eight percent, a surprisingly large number to
us, indicated that they would welcome the opportunity. Nevertheless, the dominance of reluctance and refusal again is consistent
with jurors having accepted responsibility.
Other possible explanations exist for the patterns of responses
in Table 5. Something other than the burden of capital decisionmaking may have triggered the upset response, the signs of stress,
and the reluctance to serve again.73 Hearing the details of an aggravated murder is emotionally upsetting, and being forced to be
away from job or family could make one reluctant to serve again.
Nonetheless, the responses are consistent with the acceptance of
responsibility, and, on balance, suggest that jurors did not take the
experience lightly. Of the questions in Table 5, only the one asking
about repeat service significantly correlates with juror responses to
responsibility in Question 1-1. 7" Jurors who accepted greater responsibility were less likely to want to serve again. Finding the experience upsetting or exhibiting stress, however, does not help explain juror allocation of responsibility between judge and jury.
72. See Hans, supra note 57, at 1236 (suggesting relationship between juror reactions

and acceptance of responsibility).
73. Capital trials are emotionally upsetting for any number of reasons apart from the
death-selection decision itself. See, e.g., Stanley M. Kaplan, Death, So Say We All,
PSYCHOL. TODAY, July 1985, at 48, 50.
74. Kendall's i correlating Question 5-1 with responsibility Question 1-1 yields p .913; Kendall's r correlating Question 5-2 with responsibility Question 1-1 yields p = .481;
Kendall's r correlating Question 5-3 with responsibility Question 1-1 yields p = .055.
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D. Decision Models and Responsibility
Jurors whose decisionmaking process leads them to "calculate" the sentence may feel a reduced sense of responsibility. If the
proper sentence can be arrived at through a mechanical thought
process, that process becomes responsible for the sentence, not the
juror's own moral judgment. Two questions directly probed how
jurors arrived at their decision. Table 6 presents the questions and
responses.
Question 6-1 shows that 44 percent of jurors did not report
using a calculation-like decision model. Twenty-four percent did
report adding up and weighing factors to a "minor" extent and 32
percent reported adding up and weighing factors to a "major" extent. Thus, most jurors did employ some mechanical reasoning
processes to arrive at a sentencing decision. Yet even those who
relied on an adding up and weighing process may not have been
mechanically calculating a sentence in a manner that would reduce
the juror's sense of responsibility. The way Question 6-1 is worded
would allow those who approached sentencing in a non-mechanical
manner to answer something other than "no." Mechanical or not,
the sentencing decision almost always involves some weighing of
factors. The question does not probe how mechanistically that
weighing process is being conducted. Finally, the responses to
with the levels of role
Question 6-1 do not significantly correlate
7
responsibility reported in Question 1-1.

75. Kendall's r correlating Question 6-1's responses with responsibility Question 1-1
yields p = .750. For reservations about self-reports of internal decisionmaking strategies,
see Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal
Reports on Mental Processes, 35 J. PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 250 (1977).
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Table 6. Jurors' Decision Models
6-1. In making your punishment decision, did you "add up" the factors in favor ofa death sentence
and "add up" the factors against a death sentence, and then "weigh" one side against the
other side? (Form Question V.A.5)
N
%
no, not at all
66
44%
yes, to a minor extent
36
24%
yes, to a major extent
49
32%
totals
151
100%
6-2. Of the following ways jurors make such hard decisions, rank them in order of importance for
your punishment decision.
Rank from 1 for most through 4 for least important (Form Question IV.A.6)
I=most
2
3
4=least
N % N % N % N
%
comparing or contrasting with othe cases or murdrers youkncwabout
3 2% 2 1% 14 10% 125 87%
putting togetheryour own story of what happened and why inthis case
38 27%28 20% 65 45% 12 8%
adding up the factors for and against a death sentence and weighing one
side against the other
findingonespecificfactororaspectofthecastthatmakesitclearwhat
the punishment should be

46

32% 56 39% 35 24%

6

4%

61 41% 56 38% 28 19% 3

2%

Question 6-2 shows that the most important decisionmaking
component was identifying a specific factor that triggered a sentencing response. Adding up and weighing factors was next in importance. Again, however, weighing factors does not necessarily
suggest reluctance to acknowledge responsibility. Moreover, Questions 3-3 and 3-4 show that, regardless of the outcome of the process of counting or comparing factors, jurors believed they were
free to sentence to life or death. The responses in Table 6 may
simply show that a balancing metaphor in some way captures how
many jurors would describe the process by which they determined
the defendant's sentence.
In summary, responses to several different interview questions
suggest a relatively consistent picture of juror sentencing responsibility. The "average" juror understands and accepts the key role he
plays in determining the defendant's sentencing; does not view the
law as forcing him to reach a particular sentence; does not view a
death decision as something that the courts will likely reverse; and
finds his service on a capital jury emotionally upsetting. On the
other hand, he does not think it very likely that any death sentence he imposes will actually ever be carried out. Finally, although in arriving at a sentence he probably added up and
weighed aggravating and mitigating factors, it is unclear that he
did so in a fashion which would undermine his responsibility for
the sentence he imposed. Together, these responses suggest that
the "average" juror felt a reasonably firm sense of role responsibil-
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ity for the sentence he imposed. The "average" juror is not the
juror the Milgram model would lead us to expect to find; he is
closer to the juror portrayed in the Caldwell model.
On the other hand, not all jurors are the "average" juror. A
substantial and disturbing minority of jurors do not accept role responsibility for the sentence they impose; a substantial minority of
jurors (erroneously) report that they are required to impose death
if they find the defendant's act was heinous or the defendant himself a future danger, even though most jurors at the same time
(correctly) report that the law leaves them free to choose which
sentence to impose; most jurors do not think the defendant will be
executed; and, although most jurors report being upset by the experience of serving on a capital jury, most do not experience tangible symptoms of distress. If the "average" juror is closer to the
Caldwell model, at least some jurors seem closer to the Milgram
model.
At this point, two objections to our conclusions are worth noting. Both of these objections ultimately question the validity, or
import, of the jurors' self-ascription of responsibility reported in
Question 1-1 and on which much of our analysis rests. The first
objection questions the jurors' self-ascription of responsibility on
the ground that jurors who truly accepted responsibility would
simply not have been able to impose death sentences. This claim
ultimately rests on a tautology. If accepting responsibility necessarily entails sentencing to life, then of course no death-sentencing
jurors accept responsibility. The second objection questions jurors'
self-ascription of responsibility on the ground that the jurors may
not have been truthful. We have no way to refute this claim but we
do note a pattern of responses to other questions that are consistent with jurors' responses to the direct questions about responsibility. If jurors are not telling the truth about where they believe
responsibility rests, their responsibility responses are at least consistent with their responses to other questions that bear on
responsibility.
IV. EXPLAINING JURORS' SENSE OF RESPONSBILITY

Having described jurors' sense of role responsibility, we now
explore the factors that might explain it. Although responses to
Question 1-1 show a strong sense of juror responsibility, the responses vary. Of the four possible responses, none is chosen by
more than 31 percent or less than 18 percent of the jurors. Thus,
there is a reasonable amount of inter-juror variation to try to account for.
Since this is the first study of its kind, no prior empirical re-
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sults exist to help formulate hypotheses. We therefore employ a
data analytic approach rather than trying to develop a theoretical
model from first principles.7" The interview instrument contains
hundreds of variables, many of which could be thought to bear on
a juror's sense of responsibility. For example, it contains questions
about the seriousness of the crime, the defendant's characteristics,
the jurors' personal characteristics, the jurors' personal decisionmaking processes, and the jurors' perceptions about the role of
other actors, such as judges and appeals courts. Few of these variables exhibit a statistically significant correlation with the jurors'
responses to the question whether jurors or judges are responsible
for the life and death decision (Question 1-1). We report here only
the factors that do in fact bear a noteworthy relationship to Question 1-1. Of course, in any individual study, these relationships
could arise as a matter of chance. Other researchers can assess
whether their data replicate our findings or whether these results
are a consequence of chance.
A. Factors Influencing Perceptions of Responsibility
Table 7 reports the factors that most strongly correlate with
jurors' responses to Question 1-1. The first two columns of Table 7
describe the factor, show its relationship to the jurors' sense of responsibility, and report the significance level of the relationship.
The third column shows the number of juror interviews included
in the significance level calculation. The fourth, fifth, and sixth columns report, respectively, the mean, minimum and maximum values for each factor.

76. See generally JoHN W. Tux y,
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Two features related to the crime correlate with a greater
sense of juror responsibility. Jurors reported a greater sense of responsibility when the vicious or brutal nature of the killing played
a role in their decisionmaking. The increased culpability of the defendant in such cases may trigger a greater willingness to accept
responsibility for the decision. Likewise, jurors accepted increased
responsibility if they believed the defendant had planned or intended to kill the victim, even if he was not the actual
triggerperson.
Two features related to the crime correlated with a reduced
sense of juror responsibility. If jurors reported that the killing occurred under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, they tended to ascribe greater responsibility to the judge.
This may reflect the notion that such defendants are entitled to an
insanity-like defense, at least at the sentencing stage, which the
jurors associate with the law or the judge. The last crime-related
factor suggests that jurors are less willing to accept responsibility
for the capital sentencing decision for female defendants than for
male defendants. Note, however, that only two cases involved female defendants.
All these responses are consistent with the influence jurors report when some specific feature of a case stands out to them. Jurors who felt they could point to a specific feature in a case that
made them feel they knew the proper punishment tended to accept
responsibility. This is not surprising because, having identified a
specific important factor, it would be difficult to associate that factor's influence with increased judicial responsibility.
The other case processing variable that influences juror responsibility levels suggests the significance of jurors' decisionmaking models. Jurors who respond that they decide guilt and punishment together based on similar considerations tend to view the
jury as responsible for the life or death decision. Jurors who indicate that they tend to decide guilt and punishment separately
based on different considerations assign more responsibility to the
judge. Perhaps these latter jurors tend to view the punishment decision as governed by legal standards that, when applied, mandate
an outcome. They may view the judge and the law that mandates
the outcome as one and ascribe responsibility to the judge when
they believe the law constrains them.
Of the jurors' personal background characteristics, only two
significantly correlate with their reported sense of responsibility.
Jurors who reported that they were active in politics tended to
shift responsibility for the death penalty decision towards the
judge. This comports with a stereotype that politicians don't like
to be held accountable for anything, and whose main political goal
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is to avoid blame. Jurors who stated that religion influenced their
sentencing decision tended to accept a greater share of responsibility than jurors who reported religion as less important. The influence of religion suggests that these jurors have been taught to accept responsibility for their actions.
Jurors' relationships with other actors in the case processing
system also correlated with their reported responsibility levels.
Their reaction to the judge was especially important. Jurors who
reported that the judge acted friendly toward them, or who came
to admire the judge, were more inclined to ascribe responsibility to
the judge than were other jurors. These reactions are understandable, since one is generally more willing to allocate responsibility to
those about whom one feels positively.
Jurors' who knew other jurors before the trial tended to allocate responsibility to judges. Anonymity among one's fellow jurors
somehow made it easier to accept responsibility. Lastly, jurors who
reported less trust of prosecutors also tended to ascribe responsibility to judges. Perhaps jurors view the judge as the primary
watchdog of prosecutor behavior.
B. MultivariateAnalysis
Table 7 assesses the factors influencing responsibility in isolation from one another. In actual decisionmaking, several factors
can act simultaneously. This suggests the need to analyze the data
using a statistical approach that allows simultaneous consideration
of multiple influences on juror responsibility. Table 8 assesses the
Table 7 factors using regression-like models that permit studying
the influence of those factors simultaneously. Ordered logit is used
because the dependent variable (live or die responsibility reported
in Question 1-1) is ordinal and takes on more than two values. 77
The first column in Table 8 describes each factor included in
the models. The second column, which reproduces the second column of Table 7, indicates whether the presence of the factor, regardless of the sign of its coefficient in the models, correlates with
greater judge or jury responsibility. The five model columns present different models of the jurors' reported allocation of responsibility between judge and jury. Each numerical entry in a model
77. See AGRESTI, supra note 54. The data involve multiple interviews per case and we
explored models to account for this feature. Using a random effects regression model, the
results do not materially differ from those reported in Table 8. In the fixed effects model,
dummy variables identifying each case were, as a group, insignificant. But the defendant's
sex could not be included for lack of intra-case variation and the viciousness of the crime
was of less statistical significance.
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column is the coefficient associated with the row factor for the ordered logit model represented by the column.
For example, the -.58 entry in the first row of the "model (1)"
column shows that, in an ordered logit model of responsibility, the
variable "vicious or brutal nature of the killing" had a coefficient
of -.58. Low values for this variable, which is coded on a one to
four scale (see Table 7), correspond to greater presence of viciousness. Low values of the dependent responsibility variable correspond to greater jury responsibility. The minus sign on the coefficient for viciousness therefore indicates that a decrease in the
viciousness code (which corresponds to an increase in the presence
of viciousness) points toward a decrease in value of the dependent
variable. Increased viciousness thus points towards greater jury responsibility, as reported in Table 8's second column. The second
column's summary of the direction of the effect of the increased
presence of each row factor avoids the need to trace the direction
of the relationship for each row based on the particular coding of
each row factor.
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Table 8 confirms the influence of several factors listed in Table 7. In one or more of the models in Table 8, most of the Table 7
factors are statistically significant at or beyond the .1 level. All of
the statistically significant factors retain the direction of their influence on responsibility (correlating with judge or jury responsibility) reported in Table 7.
With respect to factors related to the crime, Table 8 shows
that the viciousness of the crime, the fact that the defendant might
not have killed the victim, and the fact that the defendant was
female all influence the jurors' reported level of responsibility.
That the homicide might have been committed under the influence
of a mental disturbance, however, is a small and statistically insignificant influence when other factors are taken into account.
In all of Table 8's models, one aspect of how jurors process
cases is quite influential. Jurors who report that they decide guilt
and punishment together tend to ascribe responsibility to the
judge. Whether jurors can point to a specific feature of the case is
of reduced significance in model (2) and was insignificant in models (3) through (5). The variable representing whether jurors are
active in politics has a large coefficient in all of the models in
which it is included-models 1, 2, and 5-and the effect is statistically significant in model (5). Whether jurors' report religion as
having an impact on their decision turns out to be unimportant
when other factors are taken into account.
All of the models in Table 8 include, as an explanatory variable, whether a death sentence resulted. This variable not only fails
to achieve conventional levels of statistical significance in any
model, it is small in magnitude and undergoes a sign change depending on what other variables are in the model.
Jurors' views of the judge is an important influence on their
allocation of responsibility. Jurors who report that the judge was
someone they came to admire tended to ascribe more responsibility to the judge than did other jurors. When other factors are
taken into account, the judge's friendliness towards jurors was a
small, insignificant influence on the allocation of responsibility. Jurors' views of prosecutors and whether they knew other jurors correlate with their views of responsibility.
Some of the explanatory factors might be expected to correlate
with whether a death sentence was imposed. For example, jurors
reporting that the killing was vicious or brutal might correlate with
a death outcome. Table 8 indicates that the results are robust to
the inclusion of the sentencing outcome as an added explanatory
variable. Jurors' reported allocation of responsibility is driven by
at least some forces that do not duplicate the forces shaping the
decision to vote for life or death.
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We hesitate to make too much of Table 7's factors because the
most striking feature of the effort to explain juror responsibility
responses may be not how much, but how little, we can explain.
Given how many different things jurors were asked about in the
survey, the models' overall explanatory power is surprisingly weak.
Two reasons for the meager results are possible. First, it may be
that the jurors' responses to the responsibility question (Question
1-1) are basically random. Nothing explains them well because
there is nothing to explain. Second, their responses may correlate
with factors not revealed in the interview. Defendant characteristics, juror characteristics, facts about the crime, and the many
other facts gathered are not the sources of jurors' feelings about
responsibility. Further study would be required to detect those
78
sources.

C. Responsibility's Role in Capital Sentencing Outcomes
Concerns about the risk that capital sentencing juries assign
responsibility for sentencing to someone other than themselves rest
largely on the premise that capital jurors who lack an "appropriate" sense of responsibility are more likely to impose death
sentences than are jurors who possess an "appropriate" sense of
responsibility. To examine this hypothesized link between death
and responsibility, we next explore whether jurors' ascriptions of
responsibility help explain whether they sentenced to life or death.
The data with which to explore the sentencing decision are, in
one respect, more limited than are the data used to explore the
allocation of responsibility. There is no intra-case variation in the
sentencing variable. That is, for a given defendant, all the jurors
interviewed voted to impose the same sentence, either life or
death. The responsibility variable, in contrast, does allow for intracase variation. Jurors in the same case could and did have different
views of the allocation of responsibility between themselves and
judges. Thus, while there were 153 potential observations for the
responsibility variable, the number of observations for the sentencing variable is limited to the number of different cases, 43, not the
number of jurors interviewed. We collapsed the data to 43 cases
from the 153 interviews and computed a mean responsibility value
for each case.
Returning to Table l's Question 1-1, when asked to assign re78. Milgram had similar difficulty in using other variables to explain the degrees of
obedience and disobedience in his subjects. MoRAM,supra note 31, at 205. He concluded,
"I am certain that there is a complex personality basis to obedience and disobedience. But I
know we have not found it." Id.
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sponsibility between jury and judge, most respondents accepted responsibility. They did so whether they sentenced to life or death.
Of jurors who sat in life cases, 43 of 70 (61%) thought that
whether the defendant lived or died was strictly or mostly the
jury's responsibility. Of jurors who sat in death cases, 45 of 78
(58%) thought that whether the defendant lived or died was
strictly or mostly the jury's responsibility. These results suggest no
strong correlation between case outcomes and allocation of
responsibility.
The responses to Question 1-1 do, however, contain some evidence of such a correlation. The two possible extreme responses to
the question ("strictly jury's responsibility" and "mostly judge's
responsibility") show noticeable variation between juries that sentenced to life imprisonment and those that sentenced to death.
Twenty-six of 70 (37%) life jurors believed sentencing was strictly
the jury's responsibility while only 16 of 78 (21%) death jurors
shared this belief. Moreover, only 8 of 70 (11%) life jurors ascribed
responsibility "mostly to judges," whereas 18 of 78 (23%) death
jurors ascribed responsibility "mostly to judges."
A modest correlation thus exists between rejection of responsibility and sentencing to death. Jurors who assign sentencing responsibility to judges are more likely to have imposed death. This
result is consistent with the thesis that jurors want to blame someone else when they condemn. However, the differences between life
and death jurors are significant only at the .14 level,79 and all of
Table 8's multivariate models suggest weak and insignificant correlations between outcome and responsibility.8 0 Furthermore, as Table 1 shows, any correlation exists within an overall pattern in
which jurors accept responsibility for the life or death decision, regardless of outcome. We thus cannot reject the hypothesis of no
significant relationship between jurors' perceptions of responsibility and the sentencing outcome.
One might expect to find a relationship between sentencing
outcome and the responses to Question 4-1, where jurors indicate
they believe that few defendants will ever be executed. If Question
4-1 measures responsibility, and if jurors who accept responsibility
are less likely to vote for death, the responses to Question 4-1
should correlate with sentencing outcome. However, except for the
handful of jurors who believe nearly all murderers sentenced to
79. See supra note 54.
80. Logistic regression models in which life or death is the dependent variable and caseby-case means of Question 1-1's responses are used as an independent variable also do not
allow us to reject the hypothesis of independence. But the coefficients are not trivially small.
If more cases were available, this relationship could be more usefully explored.
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death will eventually be executed (7 of 149=5%), there is no clear
distinction between jurors who voted for life imprisonment and
those who voted for death. Overall, there is no statistically significant difference in the responses to Question 4-1 based on whether
jurors voted for life imprisonment or death.
Nor do the responses to Question 4-1 help explain the responses to Question 1-1. Models in which responses to Question 11 are sought to be explained as a function of responses to Question
4-1 have little or no explanatory power."1 The jurors who respond
to Question 1-1 by saying that the jury is responsible for the sentence are thus not necessarily those who respond that very few defendants sentenced to death will ever be executed.
V.

CONCLUSION & PROPOSED REFORMS

Eighth Amendment doctrine presupposes that an "adequate"
sense of responsibility is needed to certify the reliability of the
death-selection decision; that jurors will accept responsibility unless invited and encouraged to abdicate it; and that jurors who lack
the requisite sense of responsibility will be more apt to return a
death sentence than would jurors possessing that sense. The Caldwell rule rests on these assumptions and is designed to guard
against the risk of responsibility-shifting, which in turn guards
against the risk of an unreliable death sentence.
We have tried to test the assumptions underlying Caldwell.
The first assumption-that an adequate sense of responsibility is
necessary for a reliable sentence-we cannot test, since it is based
on a normative theory about what features a capital sentencing
process must exhibit if its results are to be "reliable." We can,
however, test the other assumptions-that jurors will generally accept responsibility unless told not to, and that jurors who do not
see themselves as responsible will tend to vote for death. As to the
first of these assumptions, the data suggest that jurors generally do
understand and accept the role they play and the responsibility
they have for determining the defendant's sentence. The "average"
juror is thus closer to the Caldwell model than to the Milgram
model. As to the second assumption, the data suggest that while
jurors who do not accept responsibility may indeed be more apt to
vote for death, the correlation between acceptance of responsibility
and sentencing outcome is relatively weak.
Our findings also suggest that when jurors consider the universe of causes leading to the punishment the defendant receives,
81. We have explored these relationships with ordinary least squares models, random
effects models, binary logit models, and ordered logit models.
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they do not and will not ignore the defendant's actions. They seem
anxious to emphasize the defendant's responsibility for his fate, for
it was his conduct that ultimately triggered the sequence of events
leading up to the sentencing decision. In addition, most jurors do
not think their decision will in fact lead to the defendant's execution, since most jurors believe most death sentences are never carried out. While this may erode jurors' sense of responsibility, we
should not expect jurors to disregard the fact that executions are,
relatively speaking, infrequent events. For these reasons, we should
not expect jurors to acknowledge an unrealistically high level of
causal responsibility. Getting them to understand and accept the
key role they have in determining the defendant's sentence may be
all we can realistically ask.
Even though our findings suggest that jurors generally accept
responsibility for the sentence they impose, the data also suggest
ample room for improvement. Many jurors continue to misunderstand or understate their responsibility for the sentencing decision.
Although these jurors constitute a minority, given the correlation,
however slight, between acceptance of responsibility and death,
jury instructions can and should be crafted to reduce the size of
this minority. For example, Caldwell might be transformed from a
negative rule into an affirmative one, as Professor Hoffman has recently urged.

2

In other words, rather than simply stop prosecutors

from telling jurors that sentencing responsibility rests elsewhere, it
would be better to openly and routinely instruct jurors that the
decision they are about to make is, despite its legal trappings, a
moral one and that, in the absence of legal error, their judgment
will be final. 83 Jurors should also be expressly told that they are
free to impose a life sentence even if they find the defendant's
crime heinous, or the defendant himself to constitute a future danger, and that weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances is
not meant to preempt, or provide a substitute for, the exercise of
their own moral judgment in arriving at the defendant's sentence.
Finally, jurors might also be instructed that, in the absence of legal
82. Hoffman, supra note 32, at 1157. In addition, our analysis should not be understood
to suggest that the Caldwell rule itself is "wrong" or misguided, or that prosecutors should
be free to tell jurors, implicitly or explicitly, that their sentencing verdict will be reviewed
on the "merits" on appeal or that they are not responsible for the defendant's sentence. Our
analysis simply suggests that, under existing law, jurors generally do accept responsibility
for the choice they make during the penalty phase. How much of this acceptance can be
attributed to the impact of Caldwell we cannot tell, since all the jurors we studied participated in capital trials conducted after Caldwell.
83. This is not true in states, such as Florida, Indiana, Alabama, and Delaware, that
legally divide sentencing responsibility between judge and jury, with the jury issuing a nonbinding recommendation to the judge, who may then "override" it.
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error, their decision will not only be final, but also that, if they
return a death sentence, their judgment will in the normal course
of events ultimately lead to the defendant's execution. Taking
these steps would help ensure that capital jurors fully understand
their "truly awesome responsibility."84

84. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 208 (1971).

